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Abstract 
Understanding how to mitigate project risk is an important aspect of project management. Risks that are not properly managed 
can lead to cost overruns, schedule delays, wasted manpower and effort, and failure of the project artifact. Deciding which risk 
mitigating actions to pursue has largely been an intuitive endeavor, relying on expert opinions which are typically opaque. A 
more quantitative approach, based on results from actual past projects, is needed. This paper presents empirical findings relating 
past risk mitigating actions and project outcomes such as project cost, project schedule, and project risk. The findings are based 
on analysis of a legacy archive of project risk and risk mitigating actions from a large design organization, as well as from 
categorizing the different types of actions found in the archive based on a taxonomy developed using the archive itself, and 
analyzing the outcomes of those different types of actions. This study presents a more quantitative understanding of the 
relationship between a project state, the risks involved, and risk-mitigating actions taken during the project. This will enable 
improved decision making with better knowledge of the possible consequences of different types of risk mitigating actions and 
their effects in decreasing project risk. 
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1. Introduction 
Understanding and managing project risk is an important aspect of any large and complex design endeavor. In 
this context, risk is defined as a state of uncertainty where a possible outcome can have an undesirable effect [1]. 
Thus, risk consists of two components: 1) uncertainty, where limited knowledge results in the inability to accurately 
or precisely understand the current state of the project or predict its eventual outcome or future state, and 2) 
undesirable effects, where an outcome can negatively affect the project. Inadequate consideration of risks can lead to 
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wasted money, effort, and time, if the undesirable effects of risks come to fruition. They can also lead to other 
secondary effects, such as having to divert resources from other projects, decreasing an 
hindering y to pursue other opportunities such as additional contracts, or being able to take 
full advantage of market opportunities in a timely fashion. 
Due to the potential negative effects of risk, there is strong motivation for project managers to obtain better 
models and information regarding the different risks that exist in a project, and to better understand how risk 
interacts with the different actions that stakeholders perform within a project. However, much of the existing 
literature on risk focuses on technical risk, such as the likelihood of individual components of a system failing and 
the effects of their failure on the system. Examples include Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA), Failure 
Modes, Effects, and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) [2], and probabilistic risk assessment techniques such as Fault 
Tree Analysis (FTA) and Event Tree Analysis (ETA) [3-6]. On the other hand, project risk includes additional 
factors such as the monetary cost of developing the technical artifact, manpower, schedule, and the opportunity cost 
of not pursuing other projects, in addition to the technical performance of the artifact. Although the two are related, 
they are not synonymous; for example, an organization could choose to use parallel development teams on a 
subsystem objective to reduce the project risk, even though the technical risk is not reduced. 
Although technical risk may be a strong indicator of project risk, methods to treat technical risk may not apply 
equally well to project risk. For example, many methods for technical risk involve bottom-up approaches, such as 
determining the likelihood of component failures, and determining how the effect of their failure propagates 
throughout the rest of the system. With the complexity of many large-scale design projects, it may be impractical to 
directly apply such an approach. Furthermore, it is not clear that project risk metrics are directly analogous to 
technical risk metrics. While technical risks can be characterized to a certain extent by whether or not the artifact is 
able to still fulfill its objective despite the negative consequences of a risk (such as the ability of an airplane to 
remain flyable given the loss of an engine), a project does not necessarily fail per se (unless it is cancelled), but 
project risks instead lead to increased costs and delayed schedules. 
To treat risk once it has been identified, there are four main categories of actions: risk avoidance, risk sharing, 
risk mitigation, and risk acceptance [7]. Risk avoidance is to circumvent events that carry the identified risk, such as 
by changing a production process such that the process step carrying the identified risk does not occur. Risk sharing 
is to transfer the risk to other parties, such as by outsourcing the production of a subsystem component, or to transfer 
the consequences of the risk, such as by purchasing insurance. Risk mitigation is to decrease the probability of the 
risk, and/or to decrease the consequences of the risk should it occur. Risk acceptance is to adapt to the risk should it 
occur, such as by creating contingency plans. 
In a design project where the design organization has direct control over the risks, risk mitigation is often the 
most appropriate strategy for treating an identified risk [8]. Thus, risk mitigating actions is the primary focus of this 
study. Identifying which types of risk mitigating actions to use, and what sequence of them has the most impact on 
decreasing project risk, would help decisions makers in planning for a project, and in adapting to different project 
conditions as they occur. 
To further this goal, we analyzed the contents of a legacy archive from a large engineering design organization. 
The contents of the archive are largely textual and were written by members of the organization about identified 
project risk issues while they worked to solve those issues. It contains reports describing risk issues that could 
substantially impact the project progress of developing a subsystem of a particular product model, and the actions of 
engineers who mitigated that particular risk. 
We created a taxonomy discovery technique that directly used the archival information to populate its categories 
and did not require external sources, such as domain experts, other than an initial taxonomy with which to seed and 
start the discovery process [9]. The taxonomy discovery technique was used to refine a taxonomy that could 
adequately categorize the different types of risk mitigating actions observed in the archive. This paper presents 
results and insights gained from analyzing the archive using the developed taxonomy, and suggests improvements to 
any archive on project risk so that future archives can be more descriptive of ongoing projects, helping engineers to 
clarify the identified project risk and the effects of their risk mitigating actions on the risk. The improvements will 
also help in understanding the relationship between project risk and risk mitigating actions, to be able to better 
predict the effects of future risk mitigating actions. 
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2. Description of Legacy Archive 
The legacy archive used for this study came from a large engineering design organization, which manufactures 
highly complex systems and has over 50,000 employees. It is termed legacy because the archive describes past risk 
information are not available to clarify the text. The archive was based on a product development project which cost 
billions of dollars involving multiple factories in different countries and spanned over a decade, although the archive 
contents themselves spanned a period of 3 years. The archive contains reports on issues that posed a significant risk 
to subsystems of this product, as well as the actions of the engineers in working to decrease that risk. There were a 
total of 185 reports in the archive. Of those reports, 68 merely detailed an identified risk without listing any risk 
mitigating actions and so were excluded from the study. The remaining 117 reports contained a total of 822 entries. 
Each report entry contained a textual description of the risk, an evaluation of the current risk likelihood and risk 
consequence levels, and the rationale for their assignment. It also contains a list of planned actions to treat the risk, 
successfu  been executed and evaluated. There is also other 
identifying information such as the department or team responsible for the particular issue. Figure 1 shows the 
layout of a typical report entry in the archive. 
Different engineers in different development teams contributed to the archive throughout its history. Although 
they may have been instructed to record specific information about a project, the thoroughness of the information 
recorded can vary among different personnel, and they may not necessarily adhere to well-defined semantics. This 
increases the difficulty of extracting useful content from this archive [10-12]. In this archive, the recorded 
information largely describes the actions that engineers performed, but not their rationale, alternatives considered, 
evaluation criteria for which of the possible alternative actions to pursue, or other information that would be relevant 
for understanding their thought process in deciding what they expected may be the most effective actions. The 
archive is thus a design history archive as identified by Rockwell et al. [13], rather than a design rationale archive. 
This distinction is important in that a design rationale archive captures the thought process behind the decisions and 
actions in an project, allowing for greater understanding of the context of each action, while a design history archive 
simply captures the outputs of that thought process, the actions themselves. This context can be highly beneficial for 
retrospective analysis. 
 
Fig. 1. Example layout of a risk report entry. 
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3. Taxonomy of Risk Mitigating Actions 
A taxonomy is a hierarchical arrangement of concepts [14]. Each concept has a description to clarify its 
definition. A taxonomy of risk mitigating actions for describing entries in the legacy archive in this study was 
developed using a taxonomy discovery technique that used the archive itself as an input as well as an initial 
taxonomy as a seed, but otherwise did not require any external sources [9]. The necessity of this technique on this 
archive was due to its legacy nature, which meant that the original engineers who authored the entries in the archive 
were inaccessible for clarification of the text or understanding their thought process behind the actions they 
executed. An advantage of this technique is that the taxonomy reflects the content of the archive more directly, as 
opposed to taxonomies that are based on expert opinion, which may differ from conventions used by practicing 
engineers, or taxonomies based on archive guidelines, which engineers may have adhered to with varying quality 
depending on training and expediency. 
The initial seed taxonomy used for this research was presented by Coughlan and Coghlan [15] in their work on 
action research. After a survey of existing risk mitigating action literature, their taxonomy of risk mitigating actions 
was judged the most applicable for this study. However, it was heavily modified to better fit this particular archive. 
Once the taxonomy was refined, it was used to categorize all 822 entries in the archive. 
3.1. Summary of taxonomy discovery technique 
The taxonomy discovery technique involves two or more (human) coders, though two were used as primary 
fined. In the context of 
this study, coding refers to the qualitative research process of adding descriptive markers or codes to segments of 
text [16]. Coding can be applied to interviews, reflexive journals, design notebooks, and a variety of other media 
where information is primarily in textual form, to categorize and externalize the meaning within the text so that it 
can be computer-interpreted and statistically analyzed. 
The two coders used a taxonomy to independently code a set of entries. On the first iteration, the taxonomy that 
they used was the initial taxonomy to seed this process, but for each iteration thereafter they used the most recent 
version of the taxonomy. They then compared the codes that they had assigned to each segment of text. If the codes 
did not match then they discussed the reasons behind how they assigned the codes and the reasons for the mismatch. 
One of the possible reasons for a mismatch was if the taxonomy was inadequate. For example, several codes may 
have been too broadly defined, leading the coders to use two different codes to describe the same action. In these 
situations, the two coders discussed how to redefine the codes to avoid mismatches in the future, and updated the 
taxonomy accordingly. Other reasons for a mismatch were if the archive lacked sufficient contextual detail for an 
accurate coding attempt, or if one of the coders did not properly understand some of the information presented in the 
archive. In the latter case, discussion focused on coder instruction. 
The coders then coded a new section of text using the updated taxonomy, and repeated this process until very few 
mismatches due to the taxonomy were found. At that point the taxonomy refinement was considered complete and 
they used the refined taxonomy to code the rest of the archive. 
3.2. Final version of taxonomy of risk mitigating actions 
The top level of the taxonomy is whether an entry was an Action, carried out by the design organization to 
mitigate the risk, or an Event, which affected the project and its risk levels but was an external influence and not 
under the direct control of the design organization. An organization can choose among different actions when 
deciding on how to mitigate a risk, but events are an outside force affecting the risk around which the organization 
must prepare. The organization may have some influence over events, but it does not exert direct control on them. 
An example of an event is regulatory safety approval of the seat of a vehicle. Although the organization can 
influence the outcome of this event, by investing in better design or better materials, it does not directly decide on 
whether or not a particular design is approved by the regulatory agency. In this study, the focus is on risk mitigating 
actions, so events, other than being categorized as such, were not decomposed further. 
Each entry in the archive, if categorized as an action, had two further codes assigned to it: an embodiment code, 
describing how the action was carried out, and a purpose code, describing the reason for the action and how it was 
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intended to mitigate the risk. Thus, the code for each action entry consisted of an embodiment-purpose tuple, such as 
Coordinate-Gather_Data to describe multiple departments working together to gain insight into how to tackle the 
risk, or Request-Approval to describe sending information to another entity for approval with an expectation of a 
reply. Table 1 gives a summary and an example of the different categories under each action attribute. Because there 
are 4 different embodiment codes and 7 different purpose codes, there are a total of 28 possible code combinations 
that can be assigned to an action. In addition, an Event code could be assigned, for a total of 29 different codes under 
this taxonomy. During the refinement process, an additional Other code was occasionally assigned to an action 
purpose, to indicate actions whose purposes were not contained by the taxonomy, but by the end of the process the 
taxonomy purpose definitions had been refined to encompass all observed actions, so it was excluded from the table. 
3.3. Validation of taxonomy discovery technique 
Validation of the taxonomy was carried out using inter-rater reliability as a metric, or how often the two coders 
assigned the same codes to segments of text. Although consistency does not necessarily entail accuracy, it gave a 
level of confidence in the coding results and the taxonomy. In this study, the inter-rater reliability for the final 
taxonomy was 62.2%, [17, 18] of 0.556, which is considered fair to good for qualitative 
research coding [19, 20]. Validation was also carried out by analyzing how often mismatches were due to the 
taxonomy, as opposed to being due to the archive or the coders. Near the end of the taxonomy refinement process, 
very few mismatches were due to the taxonomy; 67% of the mismatches were due to ambiguities in the archive 
entries themselves, while the remaining mismatches were due to a coder misinterpreting the archive information. 
A further validation step was to use a naïve coder, so-called because he was not a part of the taxonomy 
refinement process and thus did not know the rationale behind the definitions used in the taxonomy [21]. During the 
taxonomy refinement process, it was possible that the two primary coders refining the taxonomy had high match 
rates because they came to intuitively understand the codes that each other were likely to assign to a segment of text. 
In other words, their inter-rater reliability may have been due to their tacit understanding, rather than what was 
explicitly defined by the taxonomy. To check for this, once the taxonomy was refined and considered ready for use, 
the naïve coder was given the taxonomy definitions and a few examples to familiarize him with the coding process, 
and was then given a section of the text to code. If the taxonomy were properly defined, then his inter-rater 
reliability scores with the primary coders would be similar to their scores with each other. This was found to be the 
case in the study, where the naïve coder had an inter-  0.628, 
indicating that the taxonomy captured the explicit knowledge of the coders. 
Table 1. Taxonomy of risk mitigating actions 
Attribute Category Description Example 
Embodiment Inform Primarily one-way transfer of information  
 Coordinate Multiple departments working together on action  
 Request Transfer of data with expectation of reply  
 Typical No special embodiment of action   
Purpose Gather_Data Gathering prior knowledge or observations  
 Resource_Planning Allocation of manpower and scheduling  
 Technical_Evaluation Technical analysis and decision making e off study for method to 
 
 Technical_Planning Planning requiring technical analysis Set weight reduction goal based on 
 
 Approval Obtaining consent for an action from another 
entity 
duction 
 
 Implementation Executing a previously decided plan or process  
 Validation_and_Testing Verifying effect of action or implementation  
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Table 2. Archive action totals 
Purpose Typical Inform Request Coordinate % of Actions 
Gather_Data 44 20 10 6 10.8% 
Resource_Planning 159 13 2 47 29.7% 
Technical_Evaluation 158 2 2 29 25.6% 
Technical_Planning 74 1 1 33 14.6% 
Approval 1 1 31 31 8.6% 
Implementation 47 0 1 3 6.8% 
Validation_and_Testing 27 0 0 2 3.9% 
4. Results and Discussion 
Out of the 822 entries that were in the archive, 77 were events and were not categorized further. Table 2 gives a 
breakdown of the embodiment-purpose totals for the remaining 745 actions. The purpose codes are listed in the 
rough order that they would be expected to occur while solving a risk issue, while the embodiment codes are listed 
in order of the amount of interaction with other departments or entities involved. 
A majority of actions (55.3%) were in the Resource_Planning and Technical_Evaluation categories alone. By 
contrast, only 10.8% of actions involved making changes that will directly affect project risk, namely 
Implementation of changes and Validation_and_Testing. This indicates that engineers spend a great deal of time 
analyzing and discussing a risk issue when it is identified. 
An empirical result from this study is that engineers tended to coordinate with other departments more often 
during the initial data-gathering and planning phases, with much less coordination among departments needed as the 
planned actions are executed toward the end of risk mitigation. It was somewhat surprising that in a large 
engineering design organization, implementing changes to a design and testing the change after implementation did 
not require much coordination among departments despite the complexity of the project. 
Each entry in the archive contained a success criterion to gauge whether or not the action (or event) was 
successful, and also the result of that measurement. The result was blank if the action had not been completed. Out 
of the 745 actions, a total of 548 actions were completed and had a success or failure conclusion. Table 3 gives the 
s were about 88% successful. The 
one exception was Inform actions, of which only one failure was recorded out of 28. This however is not surprising; 
the Inform embodiment code is defined as a one-way transfer of information, such as holding a training workshop, 
and those will typically be considered a success as long as they are held. 
 
average succeeded 88% of the time, Technical_Evaluation failed about 20% of the time, meaning that the engineers 
found problems with the proposed risk mitigation solution only once they started conducting detailed computer 
simulation studies. Also, 26% of Validation_and_Testing failed, which again indicates that problems with the 
proposed solution were found only at the latter stages of the risk mitigation process. In this case, failure of a 
validation action does not indicate that the action itself failed but that the solution was not validated. A substantial 
amount of solution failures were not discovered until final testing after implementation, although it should be noted 
that the sample size was low. Since many reports did not contain a validation step, it is possible that validation was 
conducted only in the riskiest circumstances, leading to the relatively low success rate observed. 
Table 3. Action success by embodiment 
Embodiment Success Failure % Success 
Typical 318 45 87.6% 
Inform 27 1 96.4% 
Request 32 4 88.9% 
Coordinate 106 15 87.6% 
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Table 4. Action success by purpose 
Purpose Success Failure % Success 
Gather_Data 54 6 90.0% 
Resource_Planning 157 14 91.8% 
Technical_Evaluation 106 27 79.7% 
Technical_Planning 75 8 90.4% 
Approval 43 4 91.5% 
Implementation 34 1 97.1% 
Validation_and_Testing 14 5 73.7% 
Table 5. Action success by report visibility 
Visibility Success Failure % Success 
Executive 49 2 96.1% 
Program 222 24 90.2% 
Integration 208 34 86.0% 
Local 50 16 75.8% 
 
Each of the 118 risk reports analyzed contained a rating of the visibility or possible scope of effect or review of 
the risk. The visibility rating ranged from the highest, executive, to the lowest, local. The number of successful or 
failed actions within each report was tabulated according to the visibility rating of that report, with the results given 
in Table 5. Although not unexpected, the reports contained less unsuccessful actions if the level of review for the 
risk increases. This may reflect more resources devoted to mitigating the risk if it has a higher impact or greater 
engineer risk aversion toward trying potentially risky solutions if the level of scrutiny increases. 
Of the 77 observed events, 57 had success or failure recorded. Out of those 57, 46 were successful, indicating a 
success rate of 80.7%. An example of a failed event would be if a regulatory agency rejected the proposed solution 
for mitigating the risk. That the success rate for events was lower than that for actions is not particularly surprising, 
since the organization does not have direct control over events, which by definition are controlled by outside 
entities. However, this does indicate that more resources could be spent on improving the success rate of events so 
that they do not adversely affect risk mitigation. 
5. Recommendations for Improving the Archive 
In working with a legacy archive, the limitations of the archive and the possibilities for improvement were very 
apparent. Although the specific taxonomy produced by the taxonomy discovery technique in this study will vary 
depending on the archive to which it is applied, these recommendations should be applicable to most project 
archives, especially ones that record details regarding project risk and risk mitigating actions. 
5.1. Design history archive vs design rationale archive 
The archive used for this study was a design history archive, focusing primarily on recording the actions that 
engineers took while mitigating project risk. 
reasoning behind the actions, the alternatives considered, and other aspects of the risk mitigation thought process. 
Such an archive would be a lot more useful for retrospective analysis in understanding how engineers went about 
solving problems, and also in diagnosing which approaches tended to work better than others. This would be 
invaluable for large scale statistical analysis of risk databases, to determine the most promising approaches for 
mitigating risk in a given project state or situation. By having engineers document their rationale, a design rationale 
database would also encourage engineers to think through the risk mitigating actions that they are proposing, 
improving the quality of their work. 
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5.2. Consistent terminology 
Many different engineers contributed to the archive. However, many of them used the same word to mean 
d
to technical an
. 
Developing a set of terminology to be used across the organization would greatly simplify analysis of the 
database. In this study, the analysis was manual in nature, but a more large-scale study to extract risk and risk 
mitigating action relationships of a more statistical significance would likely need to be automated. Despite the 
development of ontologies to describe the project design process and project risk, the use of such words can make it 
difficult to extract accurate descriptions of the archival content. 
5.3. Structured archive 
Although the legacy archive had a variety of different fields to input different items relating to a project risk 
issue, the content of each field varied greatly from report to report. Thus, codifying the actions required searching in 
multiple fields to extract enough contextual information for an accurate classification. A more structured archive 
could capture the information in a more well-defined way, making it easier to ascertain and reconstruct the decisions 
and actions that occurred during risk mitigation. 
 
For retrospective analysis, the ideal project risk archive would contain enough content to understand the project 
and various project factors such as its schedule, a listing of the decisions and actions during the project, their 
rationale, intended effect, and actual resultant effects on the project. The content should also be in an easily 
extracted form, so that automated data mining techniques can be used to determine the most beneficial actions to 
execute in a given situation. These recommendations will help improve archives toward that goal. 
6. Conclusion 
This paper presented results and insights on project risk and risk mitigating actions gained from analyzing a 
legacy risk archive from a large design organization. It also presented techniques that do not rely on external sources 
beyond an initial taxonomy that can be used for classifying information in an archive that is largely unstructured and 
textual in nature. Recommendations for improving future similar archives are also presented. Further study into such 
archives can help improve understanding of the interaction between risk and risk mitigating actions, allowing for 
better decision making of actions in future projects. 
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